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DARWINIAN DISCOURSE
Mike Hawkins: Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. x, 344. $69.95.)
Edward Caudill: Darwinian Myths: The Legends and Misuses of a Theory.
(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1997. Pp. xxi, 184. $35.00.)
For more than two decades, historians have been revising earlier views
of Charles Darwin and his legacy. The portrait of scientific truth triumphing
almost effortlessly on its merits has yielded to accounts of the contested politics
of Victorian science. The "warfare" of science with theology appears instead
to have been a struggle within rather than between the two communities.
The conventional portrait of a ubiquitous" social Darwinism" has come under
fire for maligning Darwin, exaggerating his influence on social thought ,
and distorting the views of many thinkers to whom the label is applied.
Joining these debates, Edward Caudill lends the revisionists qualified support
in an account of four "Darwinian myths." Mike Hawkins, in contrast, mounts
a direct challenge to the revisionists.
A professor of journalism at the University of Tennessee, Caudill first
focuses on press reaction and "popular" response in three areas: the media
blitz that contributed to the swift acceptance of his theory in the scientific
community the 1860s; T. H. Huxley's alleged "victory" in his debate with
Bishop Samuel Wilberforce in 1860; and Darwin's alleged deathbed
recantation of his theory reported by a Lady Elizabeth Hope four decades
later. Darwin's relatively quick victory within the scientific community during
the 1860s was "indebted substantially to the avalanche of reviews and popular
lectures loosed upon the public" orchestrated by young scientists organized
for a time around the Natural History Review, he argues (p. 1). Press reports of
the Huxley-Wilberforce debate reveal no clear "winner" and suggest that
revisionist accounts" are more correct than traditional histories" (p. 45). The
recantation, in tum, defies both "fact and logic" (p. 2).
A fourth "myth" encompasses episodes in the history of "social
Darwinism": alleged uses of Darwinism by laissez-faire apologists Herbert
Spencer and William Graham Sumner; its role in debates over imperialism
during the Spanish American War; and its use by eugenicists in the United
States and later in Nazi Germany. Caudill's strategies here are those I term
"soft" revisionism. Positing a sharp distinction between "empirically based
theory" and "philosophy, "he distances Darwin from Spencer and both from
later misapplications of evolutionary theory. He further argues that prominent
"social Darwinists" held views at odds with those implied by the term. Finally,
ideologies of race and imperialism contained few traces of Darwinian rhetoric,
and in any case, were less important than economics in shaping policy.
Darwinian Myths performs a useful service in treating different
dimensions of revisionism in a single volume. Specialists, however, will find
the book disappointing. Caudill's first three "myths" have either been already
exposed or persist only in subcultures at the fringes of scholarship. At least
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half a dozen scholars (identified in the notes but described in the text as
"only a handful"[p. 31]) have questioned Huxley's victory over Wilberforce,
among them Stephen Jay Gould in a characteristically brilliant and witty
essay more than a decade ago. Darwin's deathbed "recantation," as Caudill
himself notes, lingers only in the annals of Creation Science. Although he culls
the press diligently, much of his evidence has appeared in earlier accounts.
On "social Darwinism" Caudill finally wishes to have it both ways.
Having contrasted Sumner's "descriptive" fact-based sociology with
Spencer's abstract philosophizing," for example, he then conflates the two
in a discussion which draws distinctions without much difference when
compared with conventional portraits of their "social Darwinism." Having
argued that economics and non-Darwinized ideologies shaped debates over
imperialism he then concludes that it is nonetheless possible "to divine social
Darwinism running beneath the clutter of ideas" (p. 95). In neither case does
he add much to our understanding of the debates.
Unlike Caudill, Mike Hawkins, who teaches at Kingston University
(U.K.), addresses the issue of definition at length, arguing that "social
Darwinism" has been anything but mythical. He finds previous definitions
wanting for casting either too wide or too narrow a net. The earliest definition
(associated with Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in American Thought
[1944] as well as my revisionist Social Darwinism: Science and Myth [1979])
traces "social Darwinism" through uses of "natural selection," "struggle for
existence," and other telltale phrases, but exempts many who share a broader
cluster of assumptions. A second equates "social Darwinism" with any
application of evolution to society, wrongly targeting theorists whose views
are fundamentally at odds with Darwinism. Also wanting are attempts to
limit the phrase to specific ideologies (eugenics, notably), and even those
which argue that Darwin himself was so involved in his social milieu that
any attempt to distinguish "Darwinism" from "social" is futile.
Hawkins instead views "social Darwinism" as a "discourse" whose
practitioners share not only a cluster of interrelated ideas, but rules for
interpreting and relating them. His cluster consists of five assumptions, the
fifth being crucial: that biological laws govern all nature; that population
pressures generate a struggle for existence; that inheritable mental and
physical traits confer advantages in the struggle; that selection and inheritance
account for new species and the elimination of others; and that this
determinism accounts for social and psychological, as well as physical
attributes among humans. A "world-view " rather than an "ideology," it is
"multivalent" in that it can be adapted to a "wide range of ideological stances"
(p. 8); "indeterminate" in that its key terms are often ambiguous and subject
to change (for example, in response to new findings in biology); and
"janiform" in that it embraces a view of nature as both a model for society
and a threat whose laws and processes are to be resisted (p. 18).
Applying this definition, Hawkins focuses on key figures in the period
1880-1945, in the process challenging the revisionists point by point. Sensitive
to the charge that his definition may appear "so bland it could go with
anything" (p. 35), he insists that "social Darwinism" was a uniquely new
development, distinct from alleged "precursors" such as Lamarckianism.
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Darwin "clearly was a social Darwinist" (p. 35), thus dating its appearance
at 1859. The earliest "social Darwinists" were ideologically diverse: from the
conservatism of Walter Bagehot to the Christian humanism of Charles Loring
Brace and the laissez-faire theories of Spencer (making irrelevant any
distinction between "social Darwinism" and "social Spencerianism").
Conversely, support of any particular ideology does not make one a "social
Darwinist," thus excluding the British Fabians, for example, despite their
embrace of eugenics. Hawkins also exempts Marx and his followers, despite
their emphasis on social struggle, as well the "peace biologists" whom the
historian Paul Crook has described in Darwinism, War, and History (1994). In
a final chapter on fascism and a Postscript on sociobiology, Hawkins denies
that "social Darwinism" declined in the 1920s and virtually disappeared after
World War II, as argued in Carl Degler's In Search of Human Nature (1991).
Because "ideology" provides no litmus for the "world view," the
sociobiologists' contention that they are not "social Darwinists" because they
do not personally advocate reactionary social policies is "irrelevant" (p. 296).
This postmodern update of the Hofstadter thesis for our present Age of
Discourse has already been hailed on the Internet as "superb corrective" to
revisionism and will rightly become the starting point for future discussion
(seehttp://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews).YetwereHawkinslessdetermined
to smite the revisionists he might have noted far more convergence than he
allows. The issues of Darwin and laissez-faire theory aside (still a major
disagreement), few would deny that Darwinism shaped often-conflicting
ideologies, whose common denominator, as Hawkins confirms but does not
acknowledge, was a mounting fear of domestic and international disorder
and a call for governmental activism as remedy. After 1890, few intellectuals
could avoid coming to terms with Darwin. The force and appeal of the theory
indeed derived from its "Janus-faced" view of nature as model and threat,
although here Hawkins could have strengthened his case had he noted that
this was never more the case than in the charge of "social Darwinism" leveled
against opponents by social activists who then recruited Darwin to their own
brands of social engineering.
Given persisting differences, would it nonetheless be better to abandon
the term "social Darwinism," as historian Peter Bowler has suggested?
Emphatically no, Hawkins insists, if only because "the term refuses to go
away"(p. 16). But the real question is why it persists. As Hawkins's discussion
of changing definitions inadvertently reveals, his portrait of a protean
"discourse" continues a strategy of addressing gaps in the historical record
by expanding definitions-such has characterized the debate for half a
century. Presented as merely descriptive, the epithet "social Darwinism"
retains the polemical and pejorative overtones that attended its birth in
debates of the 1880s. Critical analysis of individuals so branded is often
deserved, and can be presented apart from the label, as in Gould's persuasive
critique of early IQ testers in The Mismeasure of Man (1981). But the term
"social Darwinist" carries its special baggage, having perennially been
someone whom someone else does not like. This point Hawkins himself
unwittingly demonstrates in exempting those he presumably approves (from
Marx and the British Fabians to the "peace biologists") while including all
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the bad guys from Spencer to E.O. Wilson. The phrase "social Darwinism" is
with us, not because it won't "go away," or even because it clarifies historical
movements or "schools," but rather because it is too handy a weapon for
some folks to give up.
-Robert C. Bannister

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Brian C. Schmidt: The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of
International Relations. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998. Pp.
xi, 309. $19.95.)
The unique contribution of Brian Schmidt's book, The Political Discourse
ofAnarchy, is its examination of a period of time of intellectual and theoretical
discourse that is not often considered in the field of international relations.
For years, international relations scholars focused their attention on antiquity,
the Enlightenment, or the interim between World War I and World War II as
the eras which defined the field. Almost unquestioningly, the writings of
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Carr were seen as defining
the intellectual and theoretical discourse of the field. And yet, while these
writers (and others) were often considered the framers of the field of
international relations, they still provided only a basic framework for what
many claimed was the true rhetorical zenith of international relations-that
is, the post-World War II era.
In his book Schmidt takes issue with the all-too-common assumption
that the rhetorical roots of international relations are found primarily in the
eras mentioned above. Instead, he contends that an often overlooked, and
perhaps more important, rhetorical era can be found in the mid-nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. It was during this time that a mature discourse
about the issues that were to define the field of international relations was
elucidated. Instead of focusing on the realist-idealist debate which dominated
intellectual and theoretical discourse in international relations up until World
War II, Schmidt contends that the discourse of the field from roughly 1850 to
1939 demonstrates that it was issues concerning the state-that is, the presence
of anarchy and questions surrounding the sovereignty of the state-which
properly defined the field. As such, Schmidt critically examines an era of
international relations history not often studied or taught in international
relations courses. Indeed, his work bridges the gap between classical,
Enlightenment, interwar, and more recent postwar texts.
In an era when international relations is attempting to redefine itself in
the aftermath of the Cold War, Schmidt's argument is all the more timely in
that he examines a period of time when international relations was a discipline
struggling to define itself. Begun as a subset of political science, international
relations was in the mid-nineteenth century trying to find its way in the
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